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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. Chinese Communist capabilities for overt military intervention in Korea have materially increased with the deployment of additional experienced combat forces to Manchuria. Recent Chinese Communist threats to intervene if U.S. forces cross the 38th parallel are not considered to indicate such an intention; rather these statements may be designed primarily to deter U.N. military action north of the parallel and to force the admission of the Chinese Communists to the U.N.
- c. The North Koreans are preparing to continue the struggle north of the parallel and efforts are being concentrated on retaining Communist control of this area. Soviet actions in the U.N. indicate a continuation of obstructionist and stalling tactics, possibly in the belief that the North Koreans will be able to involve U.N. forces in a protracted struggle.
- d. There are no firm indications that the Soviets have as yet selected any area for diversionary action elsewhere. There is some evidence of a general heightening of Soviet precautionary measures.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA.—See current situation reports. Recent Chinese Communist statements with regard to Korea have been increasingly belligerent and have included a threat to intervene with their own forces if troops other than the South Koreans

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cross the 38th parallel. The circumstances of this announcement suggest it may have been intended primarily for psychological purposes. Additional reports now indicate that elements of the 12th and 13th Army Groups of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army have been deployed to Manchuria and field force strength there is now estimated at 155,000, thus materially increasing Chinese Communist capabilities for overt intervention in Korea. North Korean actions and other information point to the conclusion that the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R. recognize that the invasion of South Korea has failed and are concentrating their efforts on retaining Communist control of the area north of the 38th parallel. The North Koreans are making preparations to defend the area.

- b. CHINA.--There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa and the attack may have been abandoned for this year. Work on airfields on the Chinese coast is continuing.
 - c. INDO-CHINA.--A French counteroffensive has temporarily improved their position, but the threat of further Viet Minh action in Tonkin is grave and Chinese Communist logistical and training support of the Viet Minh continues.
 - d. EUROPE.--There is little evidence of unusual Soviet military activity, but reports indicate continuing logistical preparations in the Balkans, including the possible construction of additional pontoon bridges across the Danube from Rumania to Bulgaria. In both Germany and Austria, Communist-inspired activity has been more openly aggressive.
 - e. GENERAL.--An apparent reduction in the number of Soviet ships in foreign waters outside the orbit of Soviet control and other previously reported activity are generally indicative of increased Soviet precautionary measures.
3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria and capabilities for intervention in Korea have increased considerably during the past several weeks. There was no other apparent significant change during the period.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
4 October 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. A series of recent Chinese Communist pronouncements, additional evidence of the deployment of Chinese Communist Field Forces to Manchuria, and the progress of U.N. Forces in Korea have accentuated the question of immediate Chinese Communist intentions with regard to Korea.

- (1) On 3 October, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping was informed by Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai that the Chinese Communists would send troops across the frontier to participate in the defense of North Korea if U.N. Forces crossed the 38th parallel. Chou stated that this action would not be taken if only South Koreans crossed the parallel. In an interview with Chou En-lai about one week earlier, the Indian Ambassador had gained the impression that the Chinese Communists believed that the U.S. was preparing to attack them and must make their preparations accordingly, and further reported that the Chinese were extremely bitter towards the U.S. and over their failure to be admitted to the U.N.
- (2) Other Chinese Communist statements, although less definite with respect to their intentions, have been marked by an increasingly belligerent tone. Within the past two weeks the Chinese Communists have made their first open admission that they have been encouraging the return of Koreans from China to aid in the defense of North Korea. In a recent statement Mao Tse-tung placed considerable emphasis on the necessity of a strong Chinese Communist Army, and it is noteworthy that there have been no references in some time to a possible demobilization of some of the Chinese Communist forces, as was earlier announced. In public statements on the anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist government, Chou En-lai denounced the United States as "the most dangerous enemy" of China, stated that the Chinese Communists would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists," and expressed confidence that the North Koreans would ultimately win through tactics of a prolonged war of resistance.

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- (3) Despite the categoric statement to the Indian Ambassador, there is no firm evidence that the Chinese Communists intend an outright military intervention in Korea if U.S. forces cross the parallel, and there is much to suggest that this statement may have been intended to force a retardation of U.S. activity in Korea or to give psychological impetus to the extension of material aid to the Koreans. A "squeeze play" to force Chinese Communist admission to the U.N. is also possible. The fact that the statement was made privately rather than to the U.N. or in a public pronouncement has left a loophole whereby the statement can be later ignored, and the selection of the Indian Ambassador as the intermediary suggests that the Chinese Communists are attempting to magnify Indian apprehension in the hope of bringing pressure against commitment of U.S. forces north of the parallel.
- (4) With regard to Chinese Communist military capabilities to intervene in Korea, the cumulative evidence of recent reports now indicates the strong possibility of the presence in Manchuria of the 12th Army Group (38th, 39th, and 40th Armies) and of elements of unknown strength of the 13th Army Group (41st, 42d and 43d Armies), all subordinated to the 4th Field Army. Armies of the 4th Field Army previously carried in Manchuria were the 40th, 55th, 56th and 57th. On the basis of the new identifications, the estimated strength of field force troops in Manchuria has been raised from 85,000 to 155,000, making a substantial increase in experienced combat forces which would be immediately available for intervention in Korea. It is also believed that there are substantial numbers of Koreans still attached to these armies who could be made available to North Korea either as individuals or organized units. There continues to be no good evidence that the Chinese Communists have yet committed any forces other than individual Koreans released from their armies. The recent report of a heavy convoy moving southward from the Manchurian border is believed to represent only a continuation of previous supply shipments, but does support other indications that Soviet and Chinese Communist aid to the North Koreans is continuing.

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- (5) North Korean actions and other available information point to the conclusion that the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R. recognize that the invasion of South Korea has failed and are now concentrating their efforts on retaining Communist control of the area north of the 38th parallel. There is no indication that the North Koreans are preparing to terminate hostilities or accept the surrender terms. Soviet actions in the U.N. suggest that the U.S.S.R. is willing to negotiate on the Korean question, but the fact that the Soviets have to date limited their proposals to terms obviously unacceptable to the Western powers indicates they may continue obstructionist and stalling tactics. The possibility cannot be discounted that the U.S.S.R. and Communist China have not yet firmly decided on a course of action if U.N. advances continue, and that they still hope to involve U.N. forces in a protracted and indecisive winter campaign without committing forces other than North Koreans.

b. There are no indications of an imminent invasion of Formosa. There was a light bombardment of Chinmen during the week but Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance of the Fukien coast has revealed no junk concentrations or other unusual activity. Work on airfields on the coast is continuing to receive priority and the Nationalists have reported the completion of the runway at Foochow. Further information confirms the previously reported blackout and evacuation of dependents from Swatow and it is reported that there is a genuine fear of a U.S. or Nationalist assault there.

c. In Indo-China, Chinese Communist logistical and training support of the Viet Minh continues, and there is an unconfirmed report of the arrival of flame throwers for the Viet Minh. This weapon would be highly useful in attacks against French posts and watchtowers, many of which are made of wood. The French continue to take a grave view of the Viet Minh threat in Tonkin, and French and Vietnam morale has declined considerably. However, a successful French counteroffensive against the Viet Minh capital and army headquarters at Thai Nguyen has at least temporarily improved the French position. This operation was designed not only to demoralize the Viet Minh but probably also to relieve the heavy Viet Minh pressure on Cao Bang and Laokay, both of which have been reinforced by the French. Since the Viet Minh are adept at moving their headquarters rapidly and frequently, any dislocation will probably be temporary. There have been no new indications of Chinese Communist intentions to invade Indo-China, although it is a continuous possibility.

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d. The current Viet Minh attention to Laos may indicate that an attempt will be made to set up a Communist-dominated Laotian "People's Republic," possibly including persons of Laotian stock residing in north and northeast Thailand. Development of such Communist pressure on Thailand's borders, in addition to increasing internal Communist activity (which appears now to include the distribution of explosives for sabotage purposes) would make Thailand's future precarious.

e. There have been no significant new indications of Communist pressure on other countries of Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, current dissident activity in Ambon is believed to be only an internal problem and not Communist-inspired.

f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Chinese Communist capabilities for overt military intervention in Korea, utilizing experienced combat forces recently deployed to Manchuria, have materially increased. A Chinese Communist intention to take such action is not clearly indicated despite recent threats, and their threatening statements may be primarily designed to deter the movement of U.S. forces across the 38th parallel and indirectly as a bargaining point for possible entry into the U.N.
- (2) The North Koreans are evidently preparing to continue the struggle north of the 38th parallel, and their major efforts are being concentrated on retaining Communist control of this area. The Soviet attitude in the U.N. points to continued obstructionist and stalling tactics without closing the door to negotiation, possibly in the belief that the North Koreans are still capable of involving the U.N. forces in a protracted winter struggle.
- (3) There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa, and it is now believed unlikely this year.
- (4) Although a French counteroffensive has temporarily improved their position in Indo-China, the threat of further Viet Minh action in Tonkin remains grave, and Chinese Communist logistical and training support of the Viet Minh continues.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. In Germany, there have been recent reports of fairly extensive Soviet airborne training. Apart from training activity, there is no recent evidence of other unusual Soviet military activity.

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b. A question of paramount interest in connection with Soviet military intentions is the strength of Soviet units in Europe. Available information from Germany indicates a probability that Soviet troop strength there has increased by an indeterminate amount this year, but there is no good evidence that Soviet units have been raised from peacetime (about 70%) strength to war T/O. Fairly reliable information from Austria indicates that Soviet units there are not above peacetime strength. Very fragmentary reports have suggested that the Soviets intend the demobilization of the 1926 class NCO's this autumn, although there is no evidence that it has begun. Soviet action in this respect may be an important indication of intentions.

c. two additional pontoon bridges have recently been constructed across the Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria. These are reported to be at Orshovo and Svishtov, further down the river than the previously reported pontoon bridge between Calafat and Vidin. There have been no reports of Soviet troop movement in this area, however, and the establishment of these bridges, if true, may be a training exercise. A further probable indication of continued logistical preparations in the Balkans was the recent observation of new military trucks and tanks being loaded for shipment at Odessa; there have been previous reports this summer that trucks and tanks were being shipped from Odessa to the Balkans.

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d. Continuing observations have not revealed any evidence that sizeable numbers of Soviet troops are arriving in Hungary, despite various recent rumors to this effect. Soviet air activity in Rumania, recently reported as unusually heavy, appears to have diminished.

e. Recent Communist-inspired activity in both Germany and Austria has been more openly aggressive. Although weekend Communist demonstrations in West Germany were successfully handled by the police, overt Communist activity is increasing in accordance with the announced Communist policy of harassment of West Germany. In Austria, the most serious Communist demonstrations in years have broken out following the announcement of a new price-wage agreement, and there has been evidence of direct Soviet support of Communist strikers and demonstrators. The Austrian incidents were not, however, timed to coincide with Communist action in Germany, and apparently the Communists merely took opportunistic advantage of an unpopular government decree.

f. There is no information now available to indicate that the recent Afghan raid into Pakistan was Soviet-inspired. If the incident develops into a real conflict, the U.S.S.R. could be expected to exploit the situation by offering weapons to Afghanistan.

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
3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. There is evidence that the number of Soviet ships operating outside Communist-controlled waters has been gradually diminishing in the past two months, but ships are continuing to leave Soviet ports and there are no indications of general recall of Soviet shipping to home ports. This circumstance may in part be the result of increased Soviet chartering of foreign vessels which has released greater numbers of Soviet ships for short hauls in local waters, although this in turn would reflect both a greater need for local shipping and increased precautionary measures. The Soviet fishing fleet is now also reported to be leaving Icelandic waters.

b. Observations in the U.S.S.R. indicate that there has been a curtailment for about a month of flights by IL-12's, the larger of the major transport planes employed on the Civil Air Fleet, and that many of these planes are grounded at airfields. On about 15 September, IL-12's were also withdrawn from runs to Czechoslovakia. Although the IL-12's were grounded last year for modification and the Soviets have had considerable difficulty with them, it is somewhat surprising that such action would be taken at the height of good fall flying weather. This action could, therefore, indicate a desire to accomplish further modifications of these aircraft for some late fall operations.

c. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There is little evidence of unusual current military activity in Europe, although there are some indications, particularly in the Balkans, of continuing logistical preparations.
- (2) Firm indications that the Soviets intend a major action in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future are lacking, but there is some evidence of heightened Soviet precautionary measures and of increased overt Communist activity.


JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee

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